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Poulton: Counsel Appointment for Indigent Defendants in Noncapital Cases

NOTES
COUNSEL APPOINTMENT FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
IN NONCAPITAL CASES
In Florida a trial court must appoint counsel for an insolvent defendant charged with a capital crime,: but the Florida Supreme Court
has ruled that there is no Florida constitutional or statutory authority
that can be interpreted to require counsel appointment in noncapital
cases. 2 Counsel appointment for indigents may be required in some
noncapital cases, however. The United States Supreme Court held in
Betts v. Brady,3 a noncapital case, that failure of the trial court to
appoint counsel for the indigent defendant in that particular case
was not a violation of due process, but stated that in some situations
failure to appoint counsel in a noncapital prosecution would deny
a fair trial and hence violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This fair trial doctrine has subsequently been held to
require counsel appointment in two types of cases: first, when the
defendant is extremely ignorant4 or young 5 and, second, when technical legal problems are involved.6 However, "the due process clause
is not susceptible of reduction to a mathematical formula,"7 and its
asserted denial must be "tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts
in a given case." 8
These cases do not afford as much protection as might appear.
The United States Supreme Court in Bute v. Illinois"ruled that when
the appeal record is silent as to a defendant's competency to conduct
his own cause, it must be presumed that he is competent. It is conceivable, under this holding, that a defendant otherwise entitled to
'FLA. STAT. §909.21
(1957). The statute authorizes the trial judge to allow the
appointed attorney such reasonable compensation as does not exceed $500 for
trial plus $500 for appeal.
2Johnson v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 264, 28 So.2d 585 (1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
804 (1947); Johnson v. State, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So.2d 671 (1941); Watson v. State,
142 Fla. 218, 194 So. 640 (1940).
3316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
5Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
6Rice v. Olson, supra note 4; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
7Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949).
8Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
9333 U.S. 640 (1948).
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the protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment might be
denied this protection simply because no record finding as to his
competency was made at the trial. The Florida Supreme Court has
ruled more favorably for the defendant on this point, however. Sneed
v. Mayo ° involved a petition for habeas corpus by a young man
twenty-one years of age at the time of petition who had been convicted
of breaking and entering. Petitioner contended, inter alia, that the
trial court committed error in failing to appoint counsel for him.
The trial record contained no evidence as to the defendant's competency. The Court held that when there is no finding on the question
of a defendant's capacity, the issue can properly be raised in a postconviction proceeding. The case was referred to a circuit judge in
the county in which the defendant was convicted for determination
of the petitioner's capacity. In Florida, therefore, an indigent defendant who is ill equipped to conduct his own cause is sufficiently
protected procedure-wise.
Due process was first held to embrace the right to court-appointed
counsel in Powell v. Alabama,": decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1932. This case involved a capital crime, and the Court
decided no more than was necessary on the facts - that a trial court
violates due process when it fails to appoint counsel for an indigent
defendant in a capital case. Even so, many observers were surprised and disappointed when the Betts case denied the right to counsel in a noncapital case. The decision has been criticized: 12
"[Alt a critical period in world history, Betts v. Brady dangerously tilts the scales against the safeguarding of one of the
most precious rights of man. For in a free world no man should
be condemned to penal servitude for years without having the
right to counsel to defend him."
There was a six-three split in the Betts case, and the Court has
since decided unanimously only three out of nineteen cases dealing
with the counsel question. 13 Mr. Justice Douglas's statement in his
Bute dissent - that "certainly due process shows no less solicitude for
1066 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1953).
11287 U.S. 45.
'12Letter from Benjamin E. Cohen and Erwin N. Griswold, New York Times,
Aug. 2, 1942, §4, p. 6, col. 5, 7.
23BEANY,RIGHnT To COUNSEL 193 (1955).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss2/3

2

Poulton: Counsel Appointment for Indigent Defendants in Noncapital Cases
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

liberty than for life"'14 - illustrates one recurring minority objection
to the Betts doctrine. The argument has appeal. Even those who
believe that the state has assumed too many functions in modern society may still agree that counsel appointment for indigents is a
function that should have become part of American tradition decades
ago. A policy of appointing counsel for indigents differs from other
"welfare state" policies in one very important respect: the state itself
creates the need for such a measure by charging a presumptively innocent defendant with a crime. To Lord Coke's argument that a fair
judge, himself, is sufficient counsel for a defendant, Mr. Justice
Sutherland has replied: 15
"But how can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial,
effectively discharge the obligations of counsel for the accused?
He can and should see to it that in the proceedings before
the court the accused shall be dealt with justly and fairly.
He cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense,
or participate in those necessary conferences between counsel
and accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable character
of the confessional."
It is clear, then, that there are some cases - those noncapital cases
that do not fall within the area protected by the Fourteenth Amendment- in which there is, in Florida, no mandatory requirement for
counsel appointment. But the trial court does have an inherent discretionay right to appoint counsel in such cases. 6 In 1907 Justice
Hocker, speaking for the Florida Supreme Court, said that it was
in fact the practice of trial court judges to make counsel appointments
for indigents even in noncapital cases.' 7 "The practice" is a vague
term and can be equivocal. In 1957 a questionnaire concerning this
matter was submitted to the twenty-six Florida circuit judges who
have jurisdiction in their circuits over all felony cases. Fourteen replied.18 Of these, only six indicated that they make counsel appointments for indigent defendants in all noncapital cases, and two of the
six stated that they make appointments only when the defendant
'4Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 681 (1948).
"5Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932).
16Johnson v. Mayo, 40 So.2d 134, 135 (Fla. 1949) (dictum); Williams v. State.
143 Fla. 826, 834, 197 So. 562, 565 (1940) (dictum).
17Cutts v. State, 54 Fla. 21, 23, 45 So. 491 (1907).

'sOn file, University of Florida Law Review office.
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volunteers a request. In the same questionnaire the judges were
asked whether they favored some sort of mandatory requirement for
providing counsel in at least all felony cases. Seven favored such an
extension; 19 seven considered the present law, as established under
the "fair trial" doctrine of Betts v. Brady, to be adequate. The
judges' statements explaining preferences ranged from
"[I] do not see how constitutional rights can be preserved to
a defendant unless he has counsel to urge those rights,"
to

"I consider this a further extension of socialized government,
which I think undesirable.... [Miost all [criminal defendants]
would argue that they are entitled to state-paid or free attorney service. My experience indicates that State Attorneys
are faithful to their trust and do not unjustly prosecute or persecute the innocent."

Five of the seven judges who favored a mandatory requirement
for providing counsel for indigents thought a public defender system
the most desirable means of accomplishing this end; and one judge
who did not favor an extension stated that should one be made, he
preferred a public defender system to a mandatory court appointment
20
policy.
There is legislative precedent for appointment of counsel for indigents in all criminal cases; the laws of twenty-two states make such
a provision 2 1 as does Federal Rule 44.22 Twelve other states require
such appointment in all felony cases.23 Florida, along with seven other
states, is in the minority in requiring counsel appointment in capital
cases only.2"
'OThe fact that more judges favored such a provision than make it a practice

under their discretionary power can be accounted for, perhaps, by a reluctance to
impose on the bar when not required to do so.
20For a thorough analysis of possible reforms see BANr,

RIGHT TO COUNSEL 220

(1955). Beany indicates that the public defender system and the legal aid system
are equally preferable to mandatory court appointment. The main objection to
a court appointment system is the tendency of the courts to appoint young, inexperienced attorneys. See also BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 143-46

(1951).
21BEANY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL 239

(1955).

22FED. R. CalM. P. 44.
23BEANY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL

239 (1955).

2ISbid.
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